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INTRODUCTION

Some years ago, Langston Hughes wrote eloquently of a "Dream of
Freedom." His words are a fitting prelude to any consideration of the
future of affirmative action:
There is a dream in the land
With its back against the wall
By muddled names and strange
Sometimes the dream is called.
There are those who claim
This dream for theirs aloneA sin for which, we know,
They must atone.
Unless shared in common
Like sunlight and like air,
The dream will die for lack
Of substance anywhere
The dream
The dream
The dream
In any one

knows no frontier or tongue,
no class or race.
cannot be kept secure
locked place.

* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
B.S. 1962, Cornell University; J.D. 1965, University of Michigan. This paper was prepared
in connection with Judge Edwards' presentation of the John Randolph Tucker Lecture at
Washington & Lee Law School on October 9, 1987.
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This dream today embattled,
with its back against the wallTo save the dream for one
1
It must be saved for all.
There is a prophetic note in Langston Hughes' poem. It does not
purport to cite a legal principle-it is much more profound than that.
Hughes is talking about equality, fairness and justice . . . he is seeking the
eradication of the racial caste system that traps the young black man in
Ralph Ellison's novel The Invisible Man ... and he is pursuing the
fulfillment of Dr. Martin Luther King's "dream" for America. But Hughes
knew-as we have come to learn-that "to save the dream for one it must
be saved for all."
"Affirmative action" is about the American dream. It is about the
convergence of legal principles with principles of equality, fairness and
justice. It recognizes that, in order to eliminate "caste systems" in our
society, we must eradicate the barriers of race and sex-barriers which have
been designed and still function to prevent true equality for persons in this
country.
It is somewhat ironic that we are still "dreaming" of equality as we
celebrate the Bicentennial of the American Constitution; but the goal of
eliminating the effects of over two hundred years of inequality still eludes
us, even as we have enacted laws to abrogate long-standing patterns of
racial discrimination. Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court struck down
the doctrine of "separate but equal" and declared that the law must be
"color blind" in dealing with people of different races.2 In the abstract,
this principle of color blindness is extremely attractive. It is the cardinal
principle underlying our quest for true equality among all people. But in
the decades since Brown v. Board of Education, we have come to understand
that the ultimate goal of equality will not be achieved solely through
adherence to this neutral principle.
This point is most easily understood in connection with employment
discrimination (which will be the focus of this commentary). 3 Affirmative
action and preferential remedies in employment are designed to foster
equality in employment opportunity. This characteristic distinguishes preferential remedies from the traditional patterns of overt discrimination in
favor of nonminorities in our society; preferential remedies only temporarily
favor one group in order to place all individuals on par. This is not to say
that blacks, or women must be thrust into positions for which they are not
qualified. However, when the choice is between qualified nonminorities and

1. Poem written for the NAACP by Langston Hughes (Apr. 1, 1964) (unpublished).
2. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. I have previously written on affirmative action and preferential remedies in employment. See Edwards, Race Discrimination in Employment: What Price Equality? 1976 U. ILL.
L.F. 572; Edwards & Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 74
MicH. L. REv. 1 (1975).
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other qualified individuals, the remedial principle of affirmative action
militates in favor of opening the available positions to those who formerly
could not occupy them.
We now know that, because of pervasive patterns of segregation and
bias in America, some nonminorities in the job market have been conditioned to expect and receive preferences over equally well qualified blacks
and women. This cycle can only be broken by reversing the preference
temporarily until people learn to work with completely neutral criteria. In
this way, affirmative action paves the way for achievement of the American
dream.
II.

WHY DOES THE STRUGGLE CONTINUE?

In reflecting on this subject, it is sometimes difficult to comprehend
the fervor of the ongoing debate over affirmative action in employment.
When Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 4-over twenty years
ago-it established a national goal of equal employment opportunity. To
effectuate this goal, the courts and various federal agencies developed the
notion of affirmative action. Efforts to implement a policy of equal employment opportunity through the use of preferential remedies generally
received great support throughout society. It was not until some people
realized that equal rights for minority members and women would mean
increased competition for limited job opportunities that we heard cries of
reverse discrimination in response to affirmative action.
Nevertheless, beginning with the Eighth Circuit's decision in Carter v.
Gallagher5 and the Third Circuit's decision in Contractors Association v.
Secretary of Labor,6 both of which were handed down in 1971, through
the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Paradise and Johnson
v. Transportation Agency last Term, the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts have consistently reaffirmed the legitimacy of affirmative
class-conscious remedies under Title VII and the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. It is therefore somewhat perplexing, at this
late date, to hear charges of "reverse discrimination" from litigants who
seek the eradication of affirmative action in the name of equal employment
opportunity.
Despite the judiciary's long-standing and consistent approval of affirmative action, claims of reverse discrimination recently have reappeared. In
the Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,9 Local 28 of Sheet Metal
Workers' International Association v. EEOC 0 and Local No. 93, Inter-

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
107 S.Ct. 1053 (1987) (plurality opinion).
107 S.Ct. 1442 (1987).
106 S.Ct. 1842 (1986) (plurality opinion).
106 S.Ct. 3019 (1986).
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national Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland" cases before the
Supreme Court during the 1985 Term, and in Paradiselast Term, opponents
of affirmative action took the position that Title VII and the equal protection
clause forbid the use of preferential relief except as a make-whole remedy
for identified victims of discrimination. The Court flatly rejected this
argument, thereby reaffirming the principle that, to end discriminatory
employment practices, it will sometimes be necessary to extend affirmative
class-conscious relief beyond the group of individuals adjudicated as victims
of unlawful discrimination. The opponents of affirmative action, however,
have not accepted defeat. In the recent case of Marino v. Ortiz12 white
police officers in New York City challenged a promotion plan set forth in
a consent decree entered in a Title VII case brought by black and hispanic
police officers. 3
The explanation for these attacks on affirmative action simply may be
a matter of politics. Some members of the current administration argue
that color blindness is the only path to equality; not surprisingly, this
assertion has been met with unabated cynicism among civil rights advocates.
William Raspberry, the nationally-known columnist, summed up the views
of these critics when he wrote:
President Reagan insists that all of us must expect to share in the
economic sacrifice it will take to get America going again. It sounds
like elementary fairness when he says it. But the more I hear of his
proposals, the more I am reminded of the joke that has a hen
proposing to a pig that they undertake the sacrifices necessary to
produce a breakfast of ham and eggs.' 4
Another reason that the debate over affirmative action has persisted is
because a great many legal scholars and practitioners harbor the view that
the law in this area is in a state of disarray. For example, in a recent article
in the Harvard Law Review, Professor Kathleen Sullivan argues that the
Supreme Court missed the chance during the 1985 Term to truly legitimate
affirmative action by moving the concept from the remedial paradigm to a
more forward-looking justification of preferential treatment as a means to
integrate future generations in our society."5 Attorney Zachary Fasman, a
highly-respected authority on employment discrimination law, goes much
further than Professor Sullivan in his critique of the Supreme Court:
No subject in the employment discrimination field has generated
as much fruitless controversy as "reverse discrimination." A series
11. 106 S.Ct. 3063 (1986).
12. 806 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S.Ct. 586 (1988) (per curiam).
13. The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision on procedural grounds
and, thus, did not reach the merits of the petitioners' challenge to the promotional plan.
14. Washington Post, Mar. 13, 1981, at A15, col 5.
15. See Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100
HA.v. L. REv. 78 (1986). At least one member of the Court has explicitly endorsed Professor
Sullivan's approach. See Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1460 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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of muddled Supreme Court decisions addressing preferential treatment in general, and employment issues in particular, has resolved
little. Indeed, the High Court's failure to issue anything approaching
a definitive ruling on these issues, and its penchant for a multiplicity
of split opinions and apparent reversals of course, testifies not so
much to the difficulties of these issues as to some bizarre judicial
need to keep the "reverse discrimination" controversy alive. Employers, unions and public officials desiring practical guidance with
regard to affirmative action will find precious little in recent Su6
preme Court law.
There is much to be said for the views of Professor Sullivan and Mr.
Fasman. In my opinion, however, there are some coherent legal principles
governing affirmative action and preferential remedies in employment, especially after the Court's decision in Johnson last Term. Moreover, I think
that if we focus on the legitimacy of affirmative action and the coherence
and limited nature of the legal precepts underlying preferential remedies, it
is fairly easy to dismiss the many overblown claims of "reverse discrimination" that have been voiced in recent years.
III.

THE CONTINUING NEED FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
TO END EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

In considering the issues surrounding the legitimacy of affirmative
action we must begin by facing some very disturbing hard facts. Since the
passage of Title VII in 1964, the gap in unemployment rates for blacks and
whites has actually widened. Recent studies from the Department of Labor
confirm this and other sad realities of the job market. 7 In 1973, for
example, the black unemployment rate of 9.4 percent was slightly more
than twice the unemployment rate for whites. By 1979, the ratio had
expanded to nearly 2 1/2 to 1. Despite some narrowing during the recessions
of the early 1980s, the black-to-white jobless rate ratio again stood at about
2 1/2 to 1 in 1985, with the black unemployment rate averaging 15.1 percent.
In addition to this greater incidence of unemployment, blacks experience
longer jobless periods, as reflected in a higher average duration and a
greater proportion of long-term unemployment. And black men are twice
as likely as white men to end a period of unemployment by withdrawing
from the labor force. These figures are made even worse when one recognizes
that about twice the proportion of black men as white men work part-time
involuntarily. And, significantly, even when working full-time, black men
earn only about 73 percent of the median earnings of white men.
Education and level of occupation have always been strongly linked. In
1985, just one-sixth of all black workers, compared with one-fourth of all

16. Z. Fasman, Remarks at the Meeting of the National Employment Law Institute 44
(Mar. 2, 1987) (on file with the author).
17. The economic data cited in this section has been taken from: BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS AMONG BLACK AiMRicANs (1986).
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white workers, had completed four years or more of college. Moreover,
black college graduates are substantially less likely than whites to be in
managerial, professional, or precision production jobs, and, instead, are
more likely to be in lower paying and lower status service occupations. The
same is true for blacks and whites who have completed one to three years
of college. Among workers who did not continue their education after
earning a high school diploma, blacks are twice as likely as whites to be in
lower paying jobs. Given this incredible disparity in earning power between
similarly educated blacks and whites, it is not surprising that in 1984 the
median family income of blacks was only 55 percent of that of white
families.
Considerable disparity also exists between the economic status of women
and that of white males. Although the labor force participation rate for
women has steadily increased since 1964, women are twice as likely as white
men to work only part-time because they cannot secure full-time employment. In addition, even though it was found that the proportion of women
looking for work was three times greater than that for white men, the
unemployment rate for women is still significantly greater than that for
white men. Not surprisingly, therefore, almost twice as many women as
white men were found to be "discouraged workers," that is, workers who
think that they cannot get a job.
Even when women do find a job, they earn substantially less than their
male counterparts. Although this disparity in large part reflects the fact
that women hold lower level jobs within most general occupation groups,
women also tend to lag in earnings when compared to men employed in
the same jobs. Moreover, the failure of women to enter higher paying jobs
in many occupational groups may be attributable to lack of opportunity
caused by sex discrimination.
Despite this and other equally disturbing evidence of a continuing,
severe disparity in equal employment opportunities, opponents of affirmative
action claim that preferential remedies are not only illogical, but also
manifestly unjust. They argue that nonminorities should not suffer in today's
job market merely because certain employers consciously discriminated in
the past. They also claim that blacks and women who are not identified
victims of discrimination should not be rewarded for the wrongs of a prior
generation, nor should blacks or women ever benefit when there exists only
a general statistical imbalance in a particular employer's work force.
These arguments, however, fail to place the preferential remedy in its
proper perspective. We must not forget an obvious, but crucial point:
preferential remedies are designed to foster, not inhibit, equal employment
opportunities. The key concept is "remedy"-a temporary and corrective
measure. These important characteristics obviate the apparent inconsistency
in the argument that in order to end one preference (in favor of nonminorities) other preferences (in favor of minorities and women) must be
introduced. At first the idea may seem illogical. But the remedial principle
is sound; and, of course, if the goal of equal employment opportunity is
to be achieved, then we must find remedies that work.
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MEASURING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EXPECTATIONS OF
NONMINORITY EMPLOYEES

In assessing the legality of any affirmative action plan, it is very
important to recognize that "the expectations of nonminority candidates do
not become legitimate merely upon assertion."' 8 In cases of so-called "reverse discrimination" it is usually true that the complaining white male
employee can show that he would have been hired or promoted but for the
implementation of the affirmative action plan that is under challenge. But
this fact alone tells you very little because all too often nonminority
candidates have been awarded jobs principally because of their race or sex
(or, alternatively, a minority or female person has been denied the job
because of his or her race or sex).
The relevant inquiry should be whether the nonminority person would
have gotten the job apart from his white, male characteristics.When the
white, male worker in the United Steelworkers v. Weber19 case claimed that
he should have been admitted to the company's apprenticeship program
over competing black candidates, his complaint was not based on proven
superior qualifications, nor was it based on some legitimate job expectation
arising under a valid seniority agreement. A point that is often lost is that
the complainant in Weber had no greater entitlement to the apprenticeship
position than did the competing black workers. 20 The real issue in Weber,
then, was not the disappointed "expectations" of white job applicants, but,
rather, the legitimacy of the remedial aspects of the disputed affirmative
action plan.
In judging the legality of preferential remedies, the courts routinely
have required that a distinction be made between lawful and unlawful
expectations. Bona fide seniority rules, for example, implicate lawful expectations, while exclusionary seniority rules, either de facto or de jure, do
not. Likewise, the courts have distinguished expectations based on jobrelated skills from expectations based on stereotypes or arbitrary bias.
Obviously, when an affirmative action plan covers unskilled or semi-skilled
positions, and seniority is not a factor, separating lawful from unlawful
skill-related expectations becomes easier. Unskilled and semi-skilled workers

18. Ledou:x v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1302, reh'g en bane granted, 833 F.2d
368 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original).
19. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Brian Weber instituted a class action challenge on behalf of
the white production workers under section 703 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
20. While the plan at issue in Weber did "tamper[ ] with the expectations attendant to
seniority," Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1864 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), it did not abrogate any preexisting seniority rights. Because the employer in Weber
created the apprenticeship program at the same time that it mandated the preference, the white
workers had no long-standing expectations in admission to the apprenticeship program. Nor
were whites barred from the program; in fact, the plan permitted up to fifty percent white
participation. Moreover, the disadvantage in terms of admission to the program was only
temporary and, while in operation, the program did not displace any white workers from their
jobs. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 199 (1979).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 44:763

are more fungible and interchangeable. Nonminority employees, therefore,
have a far less legitimate argument that they possess skills superior to those
of minorities or women.
While the courts have permitted promotion as well as hiring preferences,
they distinguish between the two in terms of identifying and balancing
lawful expectations. Although a racial preference in initialhiring does tend
to aid one applicant at the expense of another, neither has a vested right
to be hired, and there is a less legitimate expectation on the part of the
nonminority worker than in other situations such as when promotions are
based on seniority. Promotion cases pose more difficult balancing problems
because nonminority males often have long-held expectations, but these
expectations are not always well founded. Indeed, this is evident from the
Court's decision last Term in Johnson, in which a male employee was
"ranked" marginally higher than the competing female job applicant who
eventually received the road dispatcher job at issue. The Court upheld the
promotion plan, in part, because the female applicant was found qualified
to perform the job. 2' Johnson makes clear that where minority or female
candidates for a position are qualified, the nonminority candidate's legitimate expectations are necessarily lower than they would be in a situation
where the minority or female candidates are unqualified, regardless of the
fact that an employer's rating system may somehow deem one candidate
"more qualified" than the next. In certain situations, therefore, a legitimate
expectation of promotion will not exist. And it is of no moment that some
individuals may feel disappointed or cheated-especially if the employer
had created an expectation of promotion that had no basis in anything
other than favoritism not related to job performance or seniority.
Layoffs present the most difficult balancing problems. It is one thing
to use affirmative action to hire minorities or women formerly excluded
from the work place; it is quite another thing to grant these same persons
"fictional" seniority to give them protection against layoffs. Workers who
have earned seniority through years of work, with a promise that seniority
will determine job security during layoffs, have a strong and legitimate
expectation as against those persons who claim job protection under an
affirmative action plan. In addition, although seniority systems are not
infallible, the seniority principle has long served the interests of large
segments of the working class in this country and has protected many
employees, including minorities and women, from arbitrary employer actions. Thus, any attack on seniority systems must consider the consequential
losses to all employees (versus employers) stemming from an erosion of the
seniority principle.
While the Supreme Court has never gone so far as to say that layoffs
may never be used as an instrument of remedial action, the Court in

21. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 107 S.Ct. 1442 1455 (1987); see also United States
v. Paradise, 107 S.Ct. 1053, 1073 (1987).
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Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts22 did rule that non-identified
victims of discrimination may not be awarded "fictional seniority." And in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,23 the Court strongly suggested that
an affirmative action plan may never prefer minorities over nonminority
workers in any situation involving job displacement.
Apart from these general considerations regarding the expectations of
nonminority employees, it is critical to remember that affirmative action is
necessarily more than a make-whole remedy. The Supreme Court has refused
to limit preferences to "identified" victims of discrimination. Likewise, the
Court has thus far refused to require, as a predicate to voluntary affirmative
action, formal findings of discrimination by the particular employer or
governmental unit involved.
However, just what constitutes a sufficient predicate to either a courtordered or a voluntary affirmative action plan by either a public or a
private employer remains somewhat unsettled. Rather than parse the law
case-by-case, it will be useful to present a series of scenarios that raise the
question of what purpose may justify affirmative action by an employer.
The preceding comments about lawful versus unlawful expectations of
nonminority employees will provide the overall framework for the succeeding
analysis..
V. PREDICATES TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A.

Identified "Victims" of Discrimination

The easiest case scenario involves an identified victim of discrimination.
For example, suppose that two years ago, an employer refused to hire a
minority person or a woman for a particular job because of his or her race
or sex, and a court ordered the employer to hire the individual and to give
him or her back pay for the two year period. Suppose further that a few
months later, the employer, using a "last hired, first fired" seniority system,
decides to layoff some workers. The minority person or woman who was
recently hired, but who should have been hired two years earlier, has no
seniority and is therefore the first to go. In a case like this one, where the
specific discriminatee has been identified, a court must grant retroactive
seniority. Otherwise, the effects of a proven instance of discrimination will
not be completely eradicated.
While such affirmative relief may disadvantage nonminority workers
(or for that matter minority or women workers if there are any), it does
not thwart any legitimate expectations because the workers will be in the
very same position that they would have been in but for the unlawful
discrimination, that is, if the discriminatee had been hired two years earlier.
Even if one believes that the nonminority workers should not be prejudiced

22. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
23. 106 S.Ct. 1842 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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by their employer's past discrimination, this is not a reason why they should
retain an unearned advantage. Besides, a remedy of retroactive seniority
given to an identifiable discriminatee has no effect on most employees since
the basic seniority system is left intact. The balance in such a case weighs
decisively in favor of the preferential seniority remedy. Indeed, in Franks
v. Bowman Transportation Co.,24 the Supreme Court recognized this when
it held that "identified victims" of discrimination must be awarded retroactive seniority as a make-whole remedy under Title VII.
A related situation arises when an employer refuses to promote a
minority person or a women because of his or her race or sex. No reason
exists in the case of identified victims to distinguish between hiring and
promotion. The equitable considerations are the same. The affirmative order
puts both parties-the identified victim and the non-minority workers-in
the same position that each would have been in but for the proven
discrimination. It remedies fully the unlawful discrimination suffered by the
particular minority or woman employee, but, at the same time, it does not
trammel any legitimate expectations in promotion that the nonminority
employees might have, that is, expectations based on job performance or
seniority as opposed to expectations that result from stereotypes or arbitrary
bias.
B.

Proven Unlawful Discrimination Without Identifiable Victims

A somewhat more difficult situation arises where a court finds that a
particular employer discriminated against minorities and women in the past,
but no victims of the unlawful discrimination are identified. In such a case,
affirmative relief will not always be appropriate. Rather, a court must
consider whether affirmative action is necessary to remedy past discrimination in the particular case and then take care to tailor its order to fit the
nature of the violation it seeks to correct. It should be remembered, however,
that in some cases, a court may have to resort to affirmative action because
ordering an offender to discontinue a discriminatory practice will simply
not be enough.
In Sheet Metal Workers', the Supreme Court recognized that such
relief will be necessary, for instance, "when [a court is] confronted with an
employer ... that has engaged in persistent or egregious discrimination.' '26
The Court stated further that "such relief may [also] be necessary to
dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination." 27 Yet, the Court
declined in Sheet Metal Workers' to limit preferential remedies to these
situations, leaving open the question "[w]hether there might be other
circumstances that justify the use of court-ordered affirmative action.''"

24. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
25.
26.
27.
28.

Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S.Ct. 3019 (1986).
Id. at 3050 (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id.
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Fashioning a class-conscious preferential order to remedy past discrimination by a particular employer involves the "equitable discretion" of the
district court. The court must, therefore, consider the impact that any
preferential remedy for violations of Title VII or the Constitution will have
on the nonminority workers. This requires the court to identify the lawful
expectations of the nonminority workers and to balance such expectations
against the utility of the preferential remedy. Necessarily, this is a discretionary and fact-specific inquiry; yet, certain fundamental considerations
adhere in almost every case.
When a court-ordered affirmative action plan sets a percentage or
numerical hiring goal, it will certainly have an impact on nonminority
persons by aiding one applicant at the expense of another. Nevertheless, in
such a case, nonminority applicants will usually have no vested right to be
hired-especially for a particular job. Much of the disappointment of the
nonminority applicants may stem from the fact that they have been conditioned to expect and receive a preference over equally well qualified
minorities and women. And, in any event, the nonminority applicants will
only suffer a temporary disadvantage, as the affirmative relief will cease
once the effects of the past discrimination are eliminated. Since there may
be no other way to eradicate discrimination by the particular employer, the
balance often may weigh in favor of the affirmative hiring remedy in spite
of its impact on nonminority applicants. Indeed, it should not be forgotten
that without such affirmative relief, the employer may continue to discriminate. In the Sheet Metal Workers' case, for example, the union developed
internal mechanisms to circumvent a district court's order that set a minority
membership goal, thereby perpetuating the effects of its "consistent and
egregious" past discrimination.29 The Supreme Court upheld the district
court's order holding the union in contempt for this behavior.
A court-ordered affirmative action plan that gives a preference to
minorities and women with respect to promotions raises different issues.
Where, for example, the employer traditionally promotes through a bona
fide seniority system, the expectations of nonminority employees will weigh
strongly in the balance. In this kind of case, the legality of the preferential
promotion remedy will probably hinge on the predicate for the affirmative
action plan. If the employer has engaged in persistent or egregious discrimination, a promotion preference may be the only way to correct completely
the effects of this unlawful behavior. On the other hand, if the employer
engaged in less pervasive forms of discrimination, then alternative remedies
should be considered.3"
The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved the issue of whether
a court may order preferential promotions as a remedy for past discrimi-

29. See id. at 3029, 3050.
30. See, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1293-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1115 (1985); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 294-96 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States
v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354, 1362-63 (7th Cir. 1981).
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nation. In InternationalAssociation of Firefighters,3' the Court held that a
consent decree setting goals for the promotion of minorities did not discriminate against whites in violation of section 706(g) of Title VII.32 And,
33
the Court held, in the face of an equal protection
last Term, in Paradise,
challenge, that a district court may modify an existing consent decree to
impose a one black for one white promotion requirement to remedy the
effects of past and continuing forms of egregious discrimination by the
Alabama State Police Department. However, the Court has not yet decided
whether a district court itself may order preferential promotions as a remedy
under section 706(g) of Title VII, 34 nor has it squarely addressed the question
whether court-ordered promotions outside the context of a consent decree
would violate the equal protection clause. Logic would suggest that if such
preferences are permissible in the case of consent decrees-where it is alleged
that the employer has discriminated in the past, but where such discrimination has been neither proven nor disproven in a formal trial in the district
court-then such preferences should be permissible where unlawful discrimination by the employer has been actually proven through a formal trial.
C.
1.

Voluntary Affirmative Action

The Various Types of "Voluntary" Programs

Probably the most difficult cases involving affirmative action arise in
connection with voluntary programs. Often, in such cases, there has been
no formal demonstration that the particular employer previously engaged
in unlawful discrimination against women or minorities. The critical issue,
therefore, is to determine what purposes may justify affirmative action by
an employer in the absence of a judicial finding of unlawful discrimination.
So far, the Supreme Court has identified at least three situations where an
employer may voluntarily adopt an affirmative action plan, and one situation
where it may not do so.
The least controversial situation supporting voluntary affirmative action
arises in connection with hiring and promotion "goals" adopted by government contractors pursuant to various federal regulations designed to
ensure equal opportunity. 35 These plans have survived most legal challenges
because the goals that are established for minority and female hiring usually
do not afford a preference based on race or sex. In reality the employment
goals represent nothing more than an employer's promise to make a good

31. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S.Ct. 3063 (1986).
As discussed infra, there had been no formal adjudication to determine whether the City of
Cleveland had engaged in discrimination. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
33. United States v. Paradise, 107 S.Ct. 1053 (1987) (plurality opinion).
34. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
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faith effort to hire persons who formerly have been excluded from employment opportunities.
A second situation in which voluntary affirmative action has been upheld
is when an employer enters into a consent decree to settle a claim of
unlawful discrimination. As already noted the Supreme Court recently
upheld such a "voluntary" 3 6 plan in InternationalAssociation of Firefighters, 7 even though there had been no formal adjudication of liability. In
International Association of Firefighters, the Court may have been influenced by the fact that the race-conscious relief embodied in the consent
decree was designed to eradicate what the district court referred to as the
present effects of "a historical pattern of racial discrimination." 38 What is
particularly noteworthy about the opinion, however, is that the Court held
that a district court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree
merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court itself could
have awarded after trial.3 9
InternationalAssociation of Firefightersis expressly predicated on the
Supreme Court's seminal opinion in Weber,40 which depicts the third situation in which voluntary affirmative action plans have been approved. In
Weber, the Supreme Court upheld a purely voluntary affirmative action
plan adopted by a private employer to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories. Notably, it was not shown
that the employer in Weber had engaged in any unlawful discrimination.
Rather, the employer had opened a factory and hired as craftworkers for
that plant only persons who had prior experience. Because blacks had long
been excluded from craft unions, few blacks were able to present such
credentials. As a consequence, prior to the employer's institution of the inplant preferential training program, less than two percent of the skilled
craftworkers at the plant were black, even though the area work force was
thirty-nine percent black. This "conspicuous racial imbalance, ' '41 which was
born of racial segregation in employment, was found to justify the employer's affirmative action plan.
2.

The Supreme Court's Recent Endorsement of Voluntary Affirmative
Action Plans
4
The Court's decision last Term in Johnson42 strongly reaffirms Weber. 1
In Johnson the Court upheld a county transportation agency's promotion
36. Affirmative action plans developed in a consent decree are properly viewed as a
hybrid between a purely voluntary plan and a court-ordered plan. These plans are voluntary
in the sense that they are implemented by the employer without judicial compulsion; however,
because consent decrees dispose of discrimination charges, they must receive court approval.
See Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1298 n.13, reh'g en banc granted, 833
F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
37. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S.Ct. 3063 (1986).
38. Id. at 3070.
39. Id. at 3077.
40. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
41. Id.at 209.
42. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 107 S.Ct. 1442 (1987).
43. The Johnson Court did not consider the constitutional implications of the employer's
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of a qualified female over a marginally better qualified male pursuant to a
voluntary affirmative action plan. Significantly, there was no showing
whatsoever that the agency had ever discriminated against women. Instead,
the agency recognized that women were grossly under-represented in certain
traditionally segregated job categories, and therefore chose to consider the
sex of an otherwise qualified applicant as one factor in making promotions.
The Court emphasized that the male who was passed over had "no legitimate
44
firmly rooted expectation" that he would receive the position at issue.
Weber and Johnson are different from International Association of
Firefightersin that the latter involved a judicially approved consent decree,
presumably based on the employer's historical pattern of discrimination.
However, the three cases bear certain critical similarities. In each case, the
Supreme Court upheld voluntary affirmative action plans despite the absence
of any adjudicated findings that the employer had engaged in unlawful
discrimination, and despite the absence of any identified victims of discrimination. 45 And in each case the Court indicated that race- or sex-conscious
preferences may be permissible to remedy discrimination in hiring and
promotion.
3.

The Limits of Voluntary Affirmative Action

Voluntary affirmative action is not without its limits, however, as the
Supreme Court made clear in the Wygant case. 46 Wygant involved a collective
bargaining agreement that required layoffs to be executed in reverse order
of seniority, except that nonwhite teachers had preferences to ensure that
at no time would there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid
off than the current percentage of minority personnel. There was no
apparent time limit to the affirmative action plan. The public employer
argued (and the trial court found) that the plan did not violate equal
protection because it was designed to preserve the presence of minority
teachers as "role models" for minority students, and because the plan
ameliorated "societal discrimination." 47 In a 5-4 decision the Court found
the affirmative action plan in Wygant at odds with the Fourteenth Amendment. A plurality of the Court rejected the "role model" justification out
also rejected the "societal discrimination" argument as
of hand, 48 and it ' 49
"over expansive." Moreover, the plurality believed that preferential pro-

43. The Johnson Court did not consider the constitutional implications of the employer's
voluntary affirmative action program because the issue was not ligitated below. See id. at 1446
n.2.
44. Id. at 1455.

45. A requirement that an employer admit to past discrimination before a voluntary
affirmative action plan would be justified would "create a significant disincentive for voluntary
action" because of the prospect of liability due to the admission. Id. at 1451 n.8.
46. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S.Ct. 1842 (1986) (plurality opinion).
47. Id. at 1846.
48. Id. at 1847-48.
49. Id. at 1848.
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tection from layoffs was too much of a burden on innocent white employees. 0
Nevertheless, as the post-Wygant decisions indicate, the Court has
plainly embraced the idea that affirmative action, in a carefully circumscribed form, is a legitimate and vitally important instrument for the
achievement of equal employment opportunity, especially in the context of
hiring and promotions. Of course, voluntary affirmative action plans involving hiring and promotions will be subject to an "elevated level of
scrutiny."'" In particular an affirmative action plan must be remedial, in
the sense that it seeks either to eradicate the present effects of past
discrimination or to eliminate traditional patterns of segregation that have
resulted in conspicuous racial imbalances. Indeed, the Court's decisions in
Weber, InternationalAssociation of Firefighters, and Johnson demonstrate
that it would be ironic, and indefensible, to hold that Title VII, which was
enacted to eliminate racial injustice in employment, actually bars voluntary,
race-conscious efforts to achieve that very goal.
4.

The FactualPredicate Needed to Justify
Voluntary Affirmative Action

Several important questions remain unanswered, however.5 2 In Wygant
and Johnson, the Court established that, under both Title VII and the
Constitution, the validity of an affirmative action plan must be judged by
two factors. First, a court must determine whether there was an adequate
factual predicate justifying the use of affirmative action. If the court finds
that remedial efforts were justified, it must then decide whether the affirmative action plan unnecessarily trammels the legitimate interests of nonminority or male employees.
Although application of the second prong of this test does not appear
to vary in the statutory and Constitutional contexts, the Court explicitly
stated in Johnson that the Constitution imposes greater restraints on voluntary affirmative action plans than does Title VII.53 It necessarily follows,
then, that the Constitution is more demanding in the application of the
first prong of the test, under which a court must determine whether the
employer had a sufficient factual predicate for adopting a voluntary plan.
Indeed, a comparison of Johnson and Wygant reveals that the critical
distinction lies in the quantum of evidence needed to demonstrate that the
plan was adopted for a remedial purpose. Johnson established that the
relevant inquiry under Title VII is whether there is a " 'manifest imbal-

50. Id. at 1851-52.

51. United States v. Paradise, 107 S.Ct. 1053, 1064 (1987) (plurality opinion).
52. The discussion in part V.C.4 is taken from my panel majority opinion in Ledoux v.
District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, reh'g en banc granted, 833 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
53. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 107 S.Ct. 1442, 1449-50, n.6, 1452 (1987).
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' 54

Under Wygant, by

ance' " in " 'traditionally segregated job categories.'

contrast, the test in the constitutional context is whether the employer has
a "strong basis in evidence" for concluding that affirmative action is
necessary to remedy the present effects of prior discrimination in the work
55
place.
5.

"Manifest Imbalance" Under Title VII: Determining the Relevant
Labor Market and Assigning Burdens of Proof

In any Title VII case challenging the legality of a voluntary affirmative
action plan, it is now clear that, under the "manifest imbalance" test
enunciated in Weber and Johnson, there need not be any showing that the
employer was guilty of past or present discrimination. Instead, the Court
in Johnson held that an affirmative action plan designed to overcome a
manifest statistical imbalance in a workforce is sufficient to meet the Title
56
VII requirements of a remedial purpose.
Johnson also gives some guidance on the necessary statistical analysis

to be performed under Title VII. For unskilled jobs the relevant inquiry
involves a comparison of "the percentage of minorities or women in the
employer's work force with the percentage in the area labor market or
general population. 5 7 In broad terms this test is not controversial, but in
specific cases the parties may be unable to agree on the geographic scope
58
of the relevant market.

54. Id. at 1452 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979)). In
Local No. 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, although the
Court expressly predicated its judgment on Weber in approving a consent decree embodying
preferential remedies, it did not require any specific showing of "manifest imbalance." Rather,
the Court in InternationalAssociation of Firefightersappeared to focus on whether the raceconscious relief was designed to eradicate the present effects of a "historical pattern of racial
discrimination." 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3070 (1986). The plan in International Association of
Firefighters was "voluntary" in the sense that it was developed and implemented willingly by
the employer without judicial compulsion; however, because it was incorporated in a consent
decree that disposed of the discrimination charges, it was approved by the court. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court in International Association of Firefighters indicated that, "absent some
contrary indication," the validity of such plans under Title VII and the Constitution is to be
judged under the same substantive criteria applicable to purely voluntary plans. See id. at
3073.
55. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1848 (1986) (plurality opinion).
56. See Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1452, 1453 n.11.
57. Id. at 1452. Since the proportion of children or retired persons in a population varies
substantially in different places and at different times, it is not always advisable to look at
the number of minorities or women in the total population. Where possible, a more precise
measure, the number of work-age minorities or women in the relevant geographical area,
should be employed. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DiscRRA3NAnON LAW 1353
n.240 (2d ed. 1983).
58. Compare Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1298 n.12, 1304 n.18
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (percentage of blacks in the District of Columbia in case involving District
of Columbia police officers) with Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(percentage of blacks in the District of Columbia and the nearby suburbs in Maryland and
Virginia in case involving District of Columbia firefighters). Both Ledoux and Hammon have
been set for rehearing en banc on May 4, 1988. See 833 F.2d 367, 367-69 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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More significant problems may arise in cases involving skilled positions.
In Johnson the Court noted that, in any assessment of manifest imbalance
with respect to skilled jobs, the relevant inquiry should focus on the
percentage of minorities or women in the labor market who "possess the
relevant qualifications." 9 In the few cases where a job qualification is easily
identifiable, this analysis should not be difficult to perform. If, for example,
the disputed job category requires employees to have a Ph.D. in biochemistry, it should be possible to ascertain the number of minorities or women
in the relevant labor market who possess that qualification. Thus, if minorities or women comprise one percent of the employer's workforce in the
disputed job category, but only one percent of the minorities or women in
the labor market have Ph.D.s in biochemistry, it could not be said that a
manifest imbalance exists with respect to this job category. 60
The analysis does not end here, however, for in many cases involving
skilled positions, the employer may not have such a specific and easily
identifiable job requirement. For instance, it is unclear how one should
determine the number of minorities or women in a relevant labor market
who "possess the relevant qualifications" to be an assistant manager of a
supermarket, to give but one example. The range of possible qualifications
for this type of position is so broad that any effort to quantify the number
of minorities or women who possess them may be little more than an
exercise in futility.
Moreover, even if one could devise a method to ascertain the number
of minorities or women who are currently qualified to work as assistant
supermarket managers, or the like, employers often do not look solely to
these individuals in making hiring decisions. Many employers will also hire
persons who can be trained to perform these jobs. By looking past the pool
of minorities or women who currently "possess the relevant qualifications"
to those who could potentially possess them as well, the range of conceivable
qualifications becomes so loose and flexible that a requirement that an
employer defend its affirmative action plan by reference to the specific
number of currently qualified members of the relevant labor market will be
nearly impossible to meet.
In light of these practical considerations, it is probably sufficient in
cases where job qualifications are difficult to define to use the total number
of minorities or women in the relevant labor market as a proxy for qualified
candidates in measuring manifest imbalance, unless the nonminority or male

59. Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1452 (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433
U.S. 299 (1977)); see also Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 68 (D.C. Cir.
1982) ("When the job qualifications involved are ones that relatively few possess or can
acquire, statistical presentations that fail to focus on those qualifications will not have large
probative value.").
60. In this example, the relevant labor market may encompass the entire nation. This
approach often is taken in cases involving professionals, or when the employer otherwise
recruits nationwide. See B. ScHLEi & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 57, at 1362 & n.281, 1363 &
n.289.
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plaintiffs can demonstrate that a narrower, more accurate measure can be

devised. In other words the ultimate burden of proof should rest with the
party seeking to employ a more refined statistical analysis. Such an approach
is the accepted course in Title VII disparateimpact suits brought by minority
61
or female plaintiffs.
Of course a Title VII challenge to an affirmative action plan is more

akin to a disparatetreatment case, since the nonminority or male plaintiff's
basic claim is that the employer intentionally discriminated against him or
her on account of his or her race or sex. In a disparate treatment case,

after the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of discrimination 62 and the
defendant articulates a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [plaintiff's] rejection," 63 the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the employer's
purported reason was pretextual. "As a practical matter, of course, an
employer will generally seek to avoid a charge of pretext by presenting

evidence in support of its [actions].''

64

In the affirmative action context,

the employer will introduce evidence that demonstrates that its plan has an
adequate factual predicate, and that it is narrowly tailored.6 5 In satisfying
this burden of production, Johnson permits employers to rely upon statistical

analyses that are virtually identical to those found in disparate impact cases.
Thus, it seems appropriate to look to disparate impact cases for guidance
in defining relevant job markets in affirmative action cases.
Where the job in question clearly does not involve special qualifications,
the nonminority or female plaintiffs in disparate impact cases need only
produce evidence reflecting the percentage of minorities or women in the
area labor market.6 6 In cases where it is equally manifest that specific and
identifiable qualifications do exist, the plaintiffs "may safely rely only upon

specially qualified market statistics." 67 But when the qualifications for a
disputed job category are not readily apparent, the employer in a disparate
impact case who seeks to use narrower statistics bears the "burden [of]
establish[ing] that generalized statistics do not adequately reflect the pool
'
of presumptively qualified individuals.

68

61. See, e.g., Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 483 (9th Cir. 1983).
62. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), the Court set forth
a four-part prima facie case that a complainant must meet in a disparate treatment case: "(i)
that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications."
63. Id,
64. Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1449; see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 253 (1981) ("The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.").
65, See Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1301, reh'g en banc granted,
833 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
66. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977).
67. EEOC v. Radiator Speciality Co., 610 F.2d 178, 185 (4th Cir. 1979).
68. Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 483 (9th Cir. 1983); accord EEOC
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The same approach can be easily followed in disparate treatment cases
in the affirmative action context. If a plan covers assistant supermarket
managers, for example, or other jobs whose qualifications are difficult to
identify, the burden of producing refined statistical evidence reasonably
should rest on the party who seeks their introduction-the nonminority or
male employees in this instance. This approach is consistent with that taken
in disparate impact cases. Moreover, it is consistent with established principles in disparate treatment cases, where the plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that the employer's articulated justifications for its actions
are merely pretextual. 69 In an affirmative action case, the plaintiff could
attempt to meet this burden in part by proving that the employer relied on
inaccurate generalized statistics when more refined data were appropriate.70

It would seem that, in many cases, the plaintiff's burden of proving
pretext in the affirmative action context will not be easily met. For one
thing it simply is counter-intuitive to think that an employer would purposely
rely on inaccurate statistics to defend an affirmative action plan. Generally,
employers adopt affirmative action plans with great reluctance, and are not
searching for mischievous ways to justify them. And given the highly visible
nature of affirmative action plans, an employer who relies on bogus data
would simply be inviting lawsuits. Moreover, common sense suggests that
a rational employer would not try to justify an affirmative action plan by
reference to a generalized market when, in reality, it only hires from a
specialized market. For these practical reasons, it seems reasonable to place
72
7
the burden on the plaintiffs. But most significantly, Johnson l and Wygant
hold that, in both the statutory and constitutional contexts, the plaintiffs
in affirmative action cases must shoulder the ultimate burden of proving a
plan's alleged invalidity.
6.

Voluntary Affirmative Action Involving Skilled, Non-Entry-Level
Positions

There is one additional noteworthy problem with statistics measuring
the number of qualified minorities or females in a relevant labor market.
The problem arises in promotion cases, when an employer seeks to rectify
a severe imbalance in the representation of minorities or women in a skilled,
non-entry-level position. In many instances there may be few minorities or
women in the labor market who "possess the relevant qualifications" for

v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 336 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 307 (1986); Chrisner
v. Complete Auto Transit Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1259 n.5 (6th Cir. 1981); Radiator Speciality
Co., 610 F.2d at 185.
69. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
70. Even if the plaintiffs prove that the use of generalized population data is improper,
the employer should have the opportunity to defend its affirmative action plan by "adjustling]
his statistical proof to reflect a labor pool base with the special qualifications found required."
Radiator Speciality Co., 610 F.2d at 185.
71. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 107 S.Ct. 1442, 1449 (1987).
72. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1848 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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what is undoubtedly a skilled position. At first blush, then, one might be
tempted to conclude that there is no "manifest imbalance" in the employer's
work force that would justify a preferential promotion remedy.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Weber, however, this superficial
analysis ignores the fact that there may be few qualified minorities or
women in the relevant labor market because traditional patterns of exclusion
prevented them from gaining access to entry-level positions which would
have provided the training and experience necessary before they could qualify
for the skilled, non-entry-level positions. 73 Thus, instead of measuring the
number of minorities or women in the labor market who currently possess
the requisite qualifications to perform the skilled job, the employer may
properly consider the number of minority or women employees in the labor
market who possess the relevant qualifications to perform the job from
which employees are selected to fill the skilled non-entry-level position. 74
This was the approach taken in Weber. After recognizing that it
employed very few blacks in its skilled craft positions, the employer instituted a voluntary affirmative action plan for persons entering a training
program that was designed to provide workers with the skills necessary to
function in the non-entry-level craft positions. 75 In upholding this plan the
Court did not compare the percentage of blacks in the skilled craft positions
to the number of qualified blacks in the area labor market. Certainly this
stemmed from the Court's recognition "that the proportion of black craft
workers in the local labor force was likely as minuscule as the proportion
in [the employer's] work force.' '76 Rather, the proper comparison was to
the percentage of all blacks in the area since that was the pool from which
77
the employer would select individuals for its training program.
7. Measuring "'ManifestImbalance"
Throughout the foregoing discussion of relevant labor markets, it has
been assumed that the determination of a "manifest imbalance" was not
73. See Fisher v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 544 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1115 (1981) ("When a company adopts a policy and practice of hiring in at
low level, unskilled jobs and promoting to upper-level positions based upon training received
and skills developed at the plant itself, it cannot convincingly challenge the prima facie showing
under the Hazelwood 'qualifications' dicta.").
74. See Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1453 n.10 ("[W]here the employment decision at issue
involves the selection of unskilled persons for a training program, the 'manifest imbalance'
standard permits comparison with the general labor force.").
75. Any suggestion that the employer should have placed unskilled blacks directly into
the skilled craft positions is simply ludicrous.
76. Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1453 n.10. The Court in United Steelworkers v. Weber also
recognized "that the lack of imbalance between these figures would mean that employers in
precisely those industries in which discrimination has been most effective would be precluded
from adopting training programs to increase the percentage of qualified minorities." Id.
77. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198-99 (1979). Johnson presented a
different situation. In that case there were women in the labor market who were qualified to
fill the skilled craft position at issue, and it was possible to measure their numbers. Thus, the
Court commended the employer for setting hiring goals which approximated the percentage
of qualified women in the area labor market. Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1454.
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at issue. In extreme cases like Johnson, where no minorities or women
occupy the disputed job category, it will be undisputed that a "manifest
imbalance" exists. But given the amorphous nature of the "manifest imbalance" test, this will not always be the case when some minorities or
women are already employed. The Supreme Court has not yet found
occasion to flesh out the contours of the "manifest imbalance" test,
although we know from Weber and Johnson that it obtains when there is
' 78
a "conspicuous ... imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.
As noted earlier, Johnson explicitly holds that an employer need not
produce evidence of past discrimination in order to sustain its plan under
79
Title VII, since such a requirement would increase the prospect of liability.
This is not to say, however, that an affirmative action plan cannot also be
justified by reference to evidence of past discrimination; indeed, such
evidence is often adduced in Title VII suits that result in consent decrees
which contain preferential remedies. 80 Thus, it appears .reasonable to believe
that if an employer comes forth with evidence of past or present discrimination, it need not, in addition, fully demonstrate a statistical imbalance in
"traditionally segregated job categories" in order to satisfy Title VII.
However, absent a showing of past or present discrimination, it still remains
unclear how much is enough to find "manifest imbalance."
8.

The Legality of Voluntary Affirmative Action Under the
Constitution

The last piece in the voluntary affirmative action puzzle concerns claims
arising under the Constitution. The constitutional analysis will be the same
as the one suggested for Title VII cases in most critical respects, save one.
In the Constitutional area, the factual predicate for an affirmative action
plan is not "manifest imbalance," the test articulated in Weber and Johnson,
but a "strong basis in evidence," the test set forth in Wygant.8'
Unfortunately, the plurality in Wygant did not enunciate the factors a
district court should consider in determining whether an employer had a

78. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209, quoted in Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1451.
79. See Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1451 n.8, 1457 n.17.
80. In Local No. 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, for
example, the Supreme Court noted that the Sixth Circuit had sustained the promotion plan set
forth in a consent decree because of the statistical evidence presented to the district court and
because the public employer had expressly admitted that it had engaged in discrimination. 106 S.
Ct. 3063, 3070 (1986) (citing Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 485
(6th Cir. 1985)).
81. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1848 (1986) (plurality opinion).
The sharply divided Court in Wygant was unable to formulate a single "test" applicable to
affirmative action plans challenged under the Constitution. However, the Court in Johnson
made clear that Wygant was the relevant precedent for equal protection challenges. See
Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1446 n.2, 1449-50 n.6. Therefore, until the Court indicates otherwise,
it must be presumed that the factual predicate necessary in the constitutional context is the
relatively more stringent one identified by the plurality in Wygant.
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"strong basis" for believing that remedial action was required. This much
is clear, however, from Wygant and Johnson. Because the Constitutional
standard is somewhat stricter than the statutory standard,8 2 a "strong basis
in evidence" must be something more than a "manifest imbalance." It
would appear that this something more may be a greater quantum of
statistical evidence, evidence of prior discriminatory practices, or some
combination of the two.
Only Justice O'Connor, writing separately in both Wygant and Johnson,
has attempted to elucidate the "strong basis" test. Justice O'Connor believes
that this test would be satisfied by evidence of a statistical disparity sufficient
to support a primafacie claim of discrimination under Title VIILs3 However,
this view was rejected by five Justices in Johnson because it would require
the employer "to compile evidence that could be used to subject it to a
colorable Title VII suit," a requirement that would "create a significant
disincentive for employers to adopt an affirmative action plan." '8 4 Even
though Johnson is a Title VII case, there is no reason to believe that this
concern is any less real when an affirmative action plan is challenged under
the Constitution. Moreover, even the plurality in Wygant did not suggest
that there must be a prima facie case of present discrimination in order to
justify a voluntary affirmative action plan; therefore, it seems that a "strong
basis" test is something less than a prima facie case.
While the Court has not yet described the amount or type of evidence
that will satisfy the "strong basis" test, Wygant suggests that the evidence
must be "sufficient ... to justify the conclusion that there has been prior

discrimination." 5 A test of past discrimination surely would be a telltale
difference between the Constitutional and statutory standards, since Weber
and Johnson make clear that there need be no showing of either prior or
presentdiscrimination to sustain a plan under Title VII. Whether or not
this is the sole basis for distinguishing between the "manifest imbalance"
and "strong basis" tests, it seems clear that in any case brought under the
Constitution, "evidence of actual discriminatory practices engaged in by the
public employer in the past ...

will be highly relevant to the determination

of whether the employer
had a strong basis for believing that remedial
8' 6
action was justified.

82. See Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1449-50 n.6, 1452.
83. Justice O'Connor would apply this test to any voluntary affirmative action plan,
regardless of whether the plan was challenged under Title VII or the Constitution. See Johnson,
107 S.Ct. at 1461-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Wygant, 106 S.Ct. at 1856

(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
84. Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1453.
85. Wygant, 106 S.Ct. at 1848.
86. Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1303-04, reh'g en banc granted, 833
F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir, 1987). This is not to say that evidence of past discrimination will always
be required to satisfy the "strong basis" test. In Johnson, the Court suggested that a prima
facie case of discrimination could be made out if there were a "sufficiently egregious"
statistical disparity. Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1453 n.ll. Since the "strong basis" test is something
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In considering the factual predicates in both the statutory and Constitutional settings, it must be borne in mind that the nonminority or male
plaintiffs carry the ultimate burden of proof in demonstrating the invalidity
of an employer's affirmative action plan. While this burden might be
somewhat easier to shoulder in the Constitutional context because of the
more stringent "strong basis" test, it would be ironic indeed if public
employers, having been brought belatedly under the strictures of Title VII,
could invoke the Constitution to avoid the remedial considerations prompted
by Title VII that have led to the creation of affirmative action plans in the
private sector. Moreover, it seems sensible to assume that government
agencies, as the entities charged with enforcing equal employment opportunity laws, ought to be free to lead the way in voluntary initiatives designed
to ensure equal employment opportunity. Indeed, the Court in International
Association of Firefighters appears to acknowledge these points when it
expressly notes that "there may be instances in which a public employer,
consistent with both the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in Wygant,
and [Title VII] as interpreted in Weber, could voluntarily agree to take
'8 7
race-conscious measures in pursuance of a legitimate remedial purpose.
VI.

CONCLUSION

More than fifteen years ago, in Carterv. Gallagher,"' the Eighth Circuit,
sitting en banc, rejected an absolute hiring preference for minorities but
upheld a preferential remedy requiring the Minneapolis Fire Department to
hire minorities on a one-to-two ratio until 20 qualified minority persons
were hired. The court found that the order was necessary to eradicate the
effects of past discrimination in a fire department employing 535 men, none
of whom were minorities, in a city with a minority population of nearly
seven percent of the total population. In approving the preferential remedy,
the court recognized that the need for affirmative action to achieve a societal
goal of equal employment opportunity conflicted to some extent with our
societal goal of color blindness in governmental action. On this point, the
court said:
To accommodate these conflicting considerations, we think some
reasonable ratio for hiring minority persons who can qualify under
the revised qualification standards is in order for a limited period
of time, or until there is a fair approximation of minority representation consistent with the population mix in the area. Such a
procedure does not constitute a "quota" system because as soon

less than a prima facie case, it must be that such a showing would suffice in the constitutional
context. Indeed, Justice O'Connor found that the glaring statistical imbalance in the employer's
workforce in Johnson made out a primafaciecase. See id. at 1464-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment).
87. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3073
n.8 (1986).
88. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
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as the trial court's order is fully implemented, all hirings will be on
a racially nondiscriminatory basis .... However, as a method of

presently eliminating the effects of past racial discriminatory practices and in making meaningful in the immediate future the constitutional guarantees against racial discrimination, more than a token
representation should be afforded. For these reasons we believe the
trial court is possessed of the authority to order the hiring of 20
qualified minority persons, but this should be done without denying
the constitutional rights of others by granting an absolute preference.
Given the past discriminatory hiring policies of the Minneapolis
Fire Department, which were well known in the minority community, it is not unreasonable to assume that minority persons will
still be reluctant to apply for employment, absent some positive
assurance that if qualified they will in fact be hired on a more than
token basis.8 9
Carter is a fundamentally sound judgment. It recognizes that the goal
of equal employment opportunity cannot be implemented effectively solely
through neutral employment practices. Even if all employers hereafter hired
on a truly nondiscriminatory basis, it would still be years before blacks and
women reached a status in the job market comparable to that of white
males. Thus, if the pattern of exclusion is to be broken, the present effects
of past segregation and discrimination must be eliminated now; a mere
resolve by an employer to adopt neutral principles will not do. And the
soundness of the remedial principle underlying Carter has been clearly
proven in literally scores of cities throughout this nation where blacks are
now successfully employed in formerly all-white police and fire departments.
It is important to understand, however, that decisions like Carter are
not merely sound in terms of remedial concepts-they are also fair in
dealing with the rights and concerns of minority, nonminority, male and
female persons, alike. Preferential remedies are only temporary; they seek
to serve a remedial purpose, not to impose fixed quotas; they do not cause
the displacement of white workers; they do not abrogate valid seniority
agreements; they do not exclude participation by norminority workers; they
do not require the hiring or promotion of unqualified persons; and they do
not purport to cure all of the ills of society.
Last spring Justice Marshall delivered a thoughtful speech on the
Bicentennial of the Constitution. In reflecting on the "momentous social
transformation[s]' 9 that have affected minority rights in the United States,
he said:
What is striking is the role legal principles have played throughout
America's history in determining the condition of Negroes. They

89. Id. at 330-31.
90. Legal Times, May 11, 1987, at 15, col. 1.
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were enslaved by law, emancipated by law, disenfranchised and
segregated by law; and finally, they have begun to win equality by
law. Along the way, new constitutional principles have emerged to
meet the challenges of a changing society. The progress has been
dramatic, and it will continue. 9'
Affirmative action seeks to achieve "equality by law" of which Justice
Marshall speaks. It represents a profound effort by our citizenry to secure
a truly color blind society. It is about our striving to make the American
dream a reality. The point of it all is, as Langston Hughes said many years
ago, that "To save the dream for one it must be saved for all."

91. Id. (emphasis added).

